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REFORMING THE ILLINOIS FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: AN OPPORTUNITY
TO REPAIR THE LEAKY BOAT
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Sean Bucci started www.whosarat.com, a website exposing
the identities of individuals who cooperate with government prosecu-
tors.1 The site's stated purpose is to "assist attorneys and criminal
defendants with few resources."' 2 Through the use of court docu-
ments, the site has revealed the identities of 4300 informants and 400
undercover agents.3
While attorneys, judges, and scholars debate the dangers and merits
of such a site, the effects of this kind of disclosure are not merely
hypothetical: disclosure can have real consequences for individuals
who fear repercussions for offering information to the government.
For example, the government created a dangerous situation by dis-
closing certain information about David Jay Sterling.4 Sterling was in
prison when the government asked him to provide information re-
garding his cellmate.5 In exchange for the information, prison author-
ities agreed to keep Sterling's identity confidential. 6 Sterling's
cellmate realized that someone close to him had cooperated with the
government, however, and he initiated a request for the information
pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).7 The
government granted the cellmate's request and exposed Sterling.8 Ev-
idently, Sterling's deal with prison authorities provided no assurance
that the government would not disclose his identity.9 By the time
Sterling realized the government had withdrawn its promise, his for-
1. See Adam Liptak, Web Sites Expose Informants and Justice Dept. Raises Flag, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2007, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id. The website has modified its portrayal of law enforcement officers. It now states, "We
[the website administrators] would like to make clear that we are not portraying Agents or Law
enforcement officers as rats or informants." Who's A Rat, About Us, http://www.whosarat.comi
aboutus.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
4. See Sterling v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C. 1992).
5. Id. at 47.
6. Id.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1992).
8. Id.
9. See id.
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mer cellmate already had the information and was sending him death
threats. 10 While Sterling may have suffered a real injury, a D.C. dis-
trict court could not provide him with a remedy under FOIA because
the damage had already been done." These claims, known as "re-
verse-FOIA actions," have arisen in a number of different contexts,
but they usually must meet a high burden to succeed. 12
This example of a government agency's improper disclosure of in-
formation is particularly striking because it reveals how such disclo-
sures can affect private parties. Federal and state agencies acquire a
significant amount of private information. Information submitted by
or gathered about a private party intermingles with government infor-
mation and, as a result, is subject to FOIA.13 Thus, the government is
a repository of private information and a useful source for those seek-
ing to gather such information. 14
FOIA no longer ensures an open government by disclosing infor-
mation regarding government activities.' 5 Rather, as one Supreme
Court Justice explained, FOIA has become "the Taj Mahal of the
Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-
Benefit Analysis Ignored."'1 6 The Electronic Freedom of Information
Act Amendments of 1996 have only compounded the problem.1 7
These amendments declared that FOIA should allow and improve ac-
cess to all agency records, including those regarding "non-governmen-
tal private matters.' 8
The federal government is not the only party doling out private in-
formation. Illinois, among other states, has implemented laws that
closely mirror the federal government's FOIA.19 Private individuals
10. Sterling, 798 F. Supp. at 48.
11. The court noted that Mr. Sterling had not stated a claim under FOIA because the govern-
ment had already released the information, FOIA did not provide for the award of monetary
damages, and FOIA did not provide a claim for such a situation. Id.
12. See Paul M. Nick, Comment, De Novo Review in Reverse Freedom of Information Act
Suits, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1319-23 (1989) (citing JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS, AND THE LAW § 2.02 (1989)). O'Reilly noted that victims
of improper disclosure likely only learn of the disclosure after it occurs.
13. See James T. O'Reilly, Recent Development, Expanding the Purpose of Federal Records
Access: New Private Entitlement or New Threat to Privacy?, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 372 (1998).
14. Third parties provide "[m]uch of the information contained in government documents."
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION xiii (Robert G. Vaughn ed., 2000).
15. See Nick, supra note 12, at 1307 (stating the purpose of FOIA).
16. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG., Mar./Apr. 1982,
at 15, 15 (describing the general state of FOIA and the necessity for a fundamental change in its
construction and application).
17. See O'Reilly, supra note 13, at 372.
18. Id. at 373 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 19 (1996)).
19. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1-11 (2006).
[Vol. 58:529530
REFORMING THE ILLINOIS FOIA
who may have never submitted information to the federal government
often interact with and provide information to a state agency. Thus,
state agencies in Illinois create other repositories for those seeking
information for both benign and malicious uses.20
This Comment argues that the Illinois FOIA, in its current form,
fails to protect information exempt from the statute and threatens to
undermine its purpose. Part II first provides a background of the Illi-
nois FOIA's content, procedure, and exemptions.21 Part II then ex-
amines Illinois courts' interpretation of the exemptions outlined in the
state's statute, and compares the Illinois FOIA to its federal counter-
part.22 Part III discusses the arguments against restricting FOIA dis-
closure at the federal level and how those arguments do not apply to
the Illinois FOIA.23 Additionally Part III argues that an amendment
to the Illinois FOIA is necessary for several reasons.24 First, the Act
fails to provide notice to private parties affected by government dis-
closure.25 Second, the Act provides no avenue of recourse for those
who have suffered injury as a result of improper disclosure. 26 Third,
the Act creates the potential for application of FOIA that runs
counter to its intended purpose.27 Part IV discusses the current stat-
ute's impact on the safety of Illinois residents and on the state econ-
omy.28 Finally, Part V concludes that an amendment to the Illinois
FOIA is necessary to prevent harm to private individuals and to sup-
port the purpose of the statute.29
II. BACKGROUND
An examination of the Illinois FOIA's purpose and content is nec-
essary to understand how it is incomplete. 30 The content and applica-
tion of the Illinois FOIA reveals problems stemming from three
20. See S. Illinoisian v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 747 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). This case
involved a newspaper's request for disclosure of a state agency study of cancer patients that
organized the patients by zip code, date of diagnosis, and type of cancer. Id. at 404. The state
believed that this information could reveal the identity of the subjects of the study. Id. at
407-08. The appellate court held that the trial court improperly entered summary judgment for
the newspaper with respect to that issue. Id. at 410.
21. See infra notes 30-103 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 104-135 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 136-171 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 172-235 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 175-205 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 212-235 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 236-257 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 258-263 and accompanying text.
30. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1-11 (2006).
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sources: (1) the purpose of the statute,31 (2) the extent and nature of
its exemptions, 32 and (3) the procedure by which government agencies
apply exemptions and respond to FOIA requests in both the federal
and Illinois context.33 Specifically, the Illinois FOIA does not address
situations in which a private party wishes to prevent a government
agency's disclosure of exempt information, 34 and the Illinois courts
have not yet applied the state FOIA to address this problem. 35
A. The Purpose of the Illinois FOIA
Illinois enacted the state's FOIA (the Act) in July of 1984.36 The
statute states its purpose:
Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitu-
tional form of government, it is declared to be the public policy of
the State of Illinois that all persons are entitled to full and complete
information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts
and policies of those who represent them as public officials and pub-
lic employees consistent with the terms of this Act. Such access is
necessary to enable the people to fulfill their duties of discussing
public issues fully and freely, making informed political judgments
and monitoring government to ensure that it is being conducted in
the public interest.37
The Act further provides that it "is not intended to be used to violate
individual privacy, nor for the purpose of furthering a commercial en-
terprise, or to disrupt the duly-undertaken work of any public body
independent of the fulfillment of any of the fore-mentioned rights of
the people to access ... information. ' 38 While this latter statement
appears to indicate that FOIA should not serve purposes contradic-
tory to those noted in the first paragraph, Illinois state courts have
largely ignored this section of the statute.39 The Illinois Supreme
Court stated that this section "is simply a declaration of policy or pre-
amble. As such, it is not part of the Act itself and has no substantive
legal force."'40
31. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 84-135 and accompanying text.
34. See Twin-Cities Broad. Corp. v. Reynard, 661 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
35. See id. at 404.
36. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1 (2006).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Lieber v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 680 N.E.2d 374, 380 (I11. 1997) (citing Triple
A Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 710 (Ill. 1989); Monarch Gas Co. v. Ill. Commerce
Comm'n, 633 N.E.2d 1260, 1265 (IlL. 1994)). The Lieber court cited these cases to support the
argument that this section of the statute possessed no substantive value. Id.
40. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Although the court's statutory interpretation was correct as a legal
matter, the ruling ignored this section's value as a clear declaration of
the statute's intended use in light of its overall policy.41 Furthermore,
Illinois courts have utilized the preambles of other statutes to clarify
ambiguous provisions of those statutes.42 This argument, however,
has yet to persuade the Illinois courts in FOIA cases.43 Instead, Illi-
nois courts, in determining the purpose and extent of FOIA, have
championed the principle that "[t]here is a presumption ... that public
records be open and accessible. ' '44 Thus, the courts will always read
the statute through the lens of openness. 45 Though limitations on this
openness do exist, the statute itself sends contradictory messages: its
terms are defined broadly to grant broad public access to government
records, but it allows for expansive exemptions to that access. 46
B. The Exemptions to the Illinois FOIA
The statute begins by defining the types of records that should be
open to the public.47 For purposes of the statute, a "public record" is
any record, in virtually any form, "having been or being used, re-
ceived, possessed or under the control of any public body.""4 These
public records must be available "to any person for inspection or cop-
ying."' 49 Thus, despite the overall policy in section 1, the statute ap-
pears to advocate unlimited accessibility through the definition of
"public record" in section 2 and to command indiscriminate dissemi-
nation in section 3.5o However, the Illinois legislature acknowledged
that such a principle would be unworkable and inserted a number of
exemptions to this general mandate.51
41. The court acknowledged that the preamble is a "declaration of policy," but only for the
purpose of declaring that it is "not part of the Act itself and has no substantive legal force." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
42. The defendants in Lieber articulated this point in their appellate brief, but the court did
not address the ambiguity argument. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 18, Lieber v.
Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 680 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1997) (No. 5-95-0470); Lieber v. Bd. of Trs. of S.
Ill. Univ., 680 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1997).
43. Lieber, 680 N.E.2d at 380.
44. Bluestar Energy Servs. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 871 N.E.2d 880, 885 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(citing Cooper v. Dep't of the Lottery, 640 N.E.2d 1299, 1302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).
45. See Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 548 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
46. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/2, 7 (2006).
47. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/2(c).
48. Id.
49. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3(a). This general mandate is subject to the exemptions articu-
lated in section 7 of FOIA. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7.
50. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1-3.
51. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7.
2009]
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Section 7 of the statute lists forty-three categories of information
that are exempt from the statute's general command for disclosure.5 2
While the statute originally enumerated only twenty-six exemptions, 53
the Illinois legislature has added seventeen more exemptions since
1984. 54 Through the original exemptions and those added, the Illinois
legislature has acknowledged that certain types of information are
best kept confidential and out of the general public's hands. The stat-
ute exempts a number of specific types of information: "[i]nformation
that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, ' 55 information regarding government informants or
people who file a complaint with the government,56 trade secrets and
commercial information that a public body collects from a private
company, 57 vulnerability assessments that a public health and safety
agency acquires or creates,58 and information that "the Department of
Public Health and its authorized representatives [collect] relating to
known or suspected cases of sexually transmissible disease." 59
The exemption that creates a particularly difficult situation for pub-
lic agencies excludes from FOIA "[i]nformation specifically prohib-
ited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations
adopted under federal or State law."'60 This exemption provides that a
government agency shall refuse to disclose any information that other
portions of the state or federal law define as confidential.61
For example, the Illinois Medical Studies Act (MSA) defines cer-
tain information as confidential.62 Under the MSA, all information
"used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study for
the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality, or for improving pa-
tient care or increasing organ and tissue donation, shall be privi-
leged."'63 The MSA's purpose is to ensure the accuracy and
52. Id.
53. See Pub. Act No. 84-988, § 3, 1985 Ill. Laws 6314.
54. See Pub. Act No. 83-1013, § 7, 1983 I11. Laws 6860, and Pub. Act No. 94-953, § 7, 2006 I11.
Laws 3364 (reflecting the difference between the content in the original statute and that of the
current statute).
55. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(b). A party whose privacy falls under this exemption may
consent to the disclosure of information in writing. Id.
56. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(b)(v).
57. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(g)(ii).
58. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(11). Here the exemption applies "only to the extent that dis-
closure could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the effectiveness of the measures or the
safety of the personnel who implement them or the public." Id.
59. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(cc).
60. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(a).
61. Id.
62. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101 (2006).
63. Id.
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effectiveness of self-evaluation within the medical profession "in the
interest of improving the quality of health care."' 64 The MSA notes
that such information is not discoverable in any court action and that
any disclosure of this information has no "effect upon its confidential-
ity, nondiscoverability, or nonadmissability. '' 65 Any person who im-
properly discloses information subject to this privilege commits a
Class A misdemeanor. 66
The MSA also highlights the difficulty in exempting information
from FOIA requests.67 While the language and purpose of the statute
suggest a nearly limitless application, courts have had difficulty defin-
ing its scope. Specifically, courts have struggled to determine when a
medical agency uses information in connection with a committee pro-
gram or study designed to improve internal quality control, patient
care, or to reduce morbidity or mortality.68 Hospitals and health care
providers attempt to categorize every document created by their staff
members under the privilege, while those suing these providers at-
tempt to limit the scope of this privilege.69
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in Roach v. Spring-
field Clinic,70 where a health care provider argued that the MSA cov-
ered all information a medical provider obtained and used for
purposes set forth in the statute.71 Though both the trial and appel-
late courts supported this broad interpretation of the statute, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court construed the privilege much more narrowly. 72
The court determined that the MSA does not provide a privilege for
information that a typical medical staff garners.73 Rather, the privi-
lege only applies to certain hospital and medical review committees. 74
64. Rodriguez-Erdmann v. Ravenswood Hosp. Med. Ctr., 545 N.E.2d 979, 986 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989). The court explained that the MSA "is premised on the belief that, absent the statutory
peer-review privilege, physicians would be reluctant to sit on peer-review committees and en-
gage in frank evaluations of their colleagues." Id. (citing Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1168
(I11. 1984)).
65. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2102.
66. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2105. While this section of the MSA appears to protect against
improper disclosure, the cases that address this issue reveal that courts have struggled to deter-
mine which documents are subject to the MSA, making it unlikely that a person would actually
face punishment for improper disclosure. See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
67. See Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246 (I11. 1993); Giangiulio v. Ingalls Mem'l
Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Ardisana v. Nw. Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 795 N.E.2d 964
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
68. Roach, 623 N.E.2d at 251.
69. See Roach, 623 N.E.2d 246; Giangiulio, 850 N.E.2d 249; Ardisana, 795 N.E.2d 964.
70. Roach, 623 N.E.2d at 246.
71. Id. at 249.
72. Id. at 250.
73. Id.
74. See id.
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Therefore, in response to an assertion that the MSA applies to certain
materials, a court must analyze both the nature of the materials and
the circumstances in which a medical provider or agency gathered
those materials.75 The court must also examine each document at is-
sue and determine whether it was "initiated, created, prepared, or
generated by a peer-review committee. '76 This requirement demands
that the examiner-whether it be a court, state agency, or a private
party-have extensive knowledge of both the statute and facts sur-
rounding the information.
Although this statute typically is at issue in lawsuits involving two
private parties, its application falls squarely within the realm of Illinois
state agencies. FOIA places a heavy burden upon those agencies by
demanding that "[i]f any public record that is exempt from disclosure
under Section 7 of this Act contains any material which is not exempt,
the public body shall delete the information which is exempt and
make the remaining information available for inspection and copy-
ing. ' ' 77 As an example, the Illinois Department of Public Health
(IDPH), a state government agency, offers a broad range of public
services, which includes investigating outbreaks of infectious diseases,
collecting and evaluating health statistics, and licensing hospitals and
nursing homes. 78 The IDPH, in acquiring information about licensing
and disease prevention, gathers information regarding private individ-
uals and corporations.79 Anyone interested in seeking information re-
garding private health care providers involved in the activities of the
IDPH may simply submit a FOIA request to the agency. This places
the state agency in a position in which it must determine which docu-
ments fall within privileges such as the MSA and which do not.80
The state agency must therefore make a decision regarding the ex-
tent of the MSA with the same delicacy and knowledge as the Illinois
Supreme Court.81 Although the IDPH may have the ability and
knowledge to correctly differentiate between privileged and non-privi-
leged information, it does not provide the same procedural safeguards
75. Id.
76. Chi. Trust Co. v. Cook County Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 641, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
77. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/8 (2006).
78. Illinois Department of Health, About the Department, http://www.idph.state.il.us/about/
abouthome.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
79. See id.
80. See Twin-Cities Broad. Corp. v. Reynard, 661 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
81. Whenever the state agency receives a request for information that may or may not fall
within the MSA, it must first determine whether such materials fall within that act. This was the
issue brought before the Illinois Supreme Court in Roach v. Springfield, 623 N.E.2d 246 (Ill.
1993).
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as the court system.82 The Illinois FOIA outlines the procedure by
which agencies confront this issue. 83
C. State Agency Procedures for Applying the Exemptions
The Illinois FOIA demands that government agencies provide ex-
pedient responses to those requesting information under the statute.84
As a general matter, the Act provides that "[e]ach public body shall
make available to any person for inspection or copying all public
records. ' 85 The Act also demands that a public body, upon receiving
a written request for information, respond to that request promptly.86
If a request necessitates an evaluation by agency staff to determine
whether requested information includes documents exempt under
FOIA, the agency may only extend the time for its response another
seven working days.87 The emphasis here is on expediency, and the
statute requires that state government agencies make decisions
quickly regarding the disclosure of materials that may fall within the
exemptions. 88
Furthermore, the statute does not demand that state agencies dis-
closing information notify private individuals or corporations that may
have an interest in that disclosure. 89 Specifically, this section of
FOIA-regarding responses to requests-does not address notifica-
tion to third parties affected by the agency's decision to disclose.90 A
party who submits information to a government agency believing that
such information is confidential or privileged and exempt from disclo-
sure under FOIA does not receive notification if the state agency later
determines that the information is not exempt and decides to disclose
it.91 In contrast to submitters of information, those who initiate a re-
quest for information receive extensive notification regarding that re-
82. Arguably, the IDPH does not possess the resources, skill, or motivation to make correct
determinations regarding this privilege. However, the focus of this Section is on the absence of
procedural safeguards within the state FOIA.
83. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3 (2006).
84. See id.
85. This provision is subject to the exemptions outlined in section 7 of FOIA. 5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 140/3(a).
86. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3(c). Specifically, the government agency must "either comply
with or deny a written request for public records within 7 working days after its receipt." Id.
However, "[flailure to respond to a written request within 7 working days after its receipt shall
be considered a denial of the request." Id.
87. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3(d)(v).
88. See id.
89. See generally 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1-11.
90. 5 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 140/3.
91. Id. Here, any demand for notification to submitters of information is absent.
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quest.92 When an agency determines that the requested documents
are subject to an exemption, it must notify the requesting party and
specify the exact exemption that it claims as a basis for the denial.93
Ihe Illinois FOIA poses another procedural problem in addition to
the lack of notification for those who submit information. It does not
provide an avenue for a person who submits information to appeal an
agency's decision to disclose information that may have been ex-
empt.94 In contrast, the statute clearly defines a process by which a
denied requestor may challenge an agency's decision: "Any person
denied access to inspect or copy any public record by the head of a
public body may file suit for injunctive or declaratory relief. '95 The
denied requestor may file a claim for such relief in circuit court.96
If the requesting party files a complaint in circuit court, the case
"shall take precedence on the docket over all other causes and be as-
signed for hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date and expe-
dited in every way."' 97 Additionally, the state agency has the burden
of establishing that its denial of the request was in accordance with the
FOIA exemptions. 98 Finally, the statute provides that if the request-
ing party prevails in a FOIA action, the court may award appropriate
attorneys' fees. 99
In light of FOIA's notice and procedural provisions that apply to
requestors who may not even have a strong interest in disclosure, the
lack of notice and procedural provisions available to information sub-
mitters appears all the more unreasonable. This disparate treatment
poses another series of questions concerning an agency's duty to util-
ize exemptions' 00 and notify interested third parties, 10 1 as well as an
interested third party's ability to seek judicial review of a decision to
disclose.10 2 The following Subsections address the Illinois and federal
approaches to these reverse-FOIA issues.103
92. Id.
93. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/9(a); see also Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees
v. County of Cook, 555 N.E.2d 361, 364 (11. 1990).
94. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11.
95. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11(a).
96. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11(b)-(c).
97. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11(h).
98. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11(f).
99. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11(i).
100. Twin-Cities Broad. Corp. v. Reynard, 661 N.E.2d 401, 403 (InI. App. Ct. 1996).
101. Sterling v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 47, 47-48 (D.D.C. 1992).
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 104-135 and accompanying text.
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1. Illinois Court Approach to Reverse-FOIA
Illinois's only reverse-FOIA case, Twin-Cities Broadcasting Corp. v.
Reynard, illustrates the potential for abuse of the Illinois FOIA, but it
does not provide a rule for reverse-FOIA situations involving a pri-
vate party and a government agency.'0 4 Instead, it addresses the is-
sues created by an information tug-of-war between two state
agencies.' 0 5 In Twin-Cities Broadcasting, Illinois State University at-
tempted to prevent the State's Attorney's Office from disclosing infor-
mation to a news agency. 106 The University claimed that the
information at issue was subject to an exemption under FOIA.10 7 Fur-
thermore, the University argued that the State's Attorney had a duty
to employ the exemption and refuse to disclose any information fall-
ing within that exemption. 10 8 The issue before the court was whether
one government agency may disclose information in response to a
FOIA request when another government agency "having a substantial
interest in the determination wishes to assert an exemption."10 9 The
court held that the government agency where a document originates
has a continuing interest in its protection regardless of its possession
by another agency. 110
In its ruling, the court noted that this situation was distinguishable
from a typical reverse-FOIA case because it involved two government
agencies rather than a private party and a government agency."' In
spite of this distinction, the court's analysis provided a useful example
of a party's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of certain infor-
mation. 1 2 The court noted that FOIA allows government agencies to
consult each other in deciding whether to accept or deny a request.11 3
Thus, while a government agency may share information with another,
that sharing does not give the other agency a license to disclose the
104. Twin-Cities Broad. Corp., 661 N.E.2d at 404.
105. Id.
106. The news agency sought records of a private meeting held by the Illinois State University
Athletic Council in which the Council discussed the elimination of certain athletic programs. Id.
The State's Attorney's office began investigating for the purpose of determining whether that
meeting should have been open to the public pursuant to the Open Meetings Act. Id. at 402.
The Council, through its governing body, the Board of Regents, sought to prevent the Attorney
General from disclosing that information in response to the news agency's FOIA request. Id.
107. Id. at 403.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 401.
110. Twin-Cities Broad. Corp., 661 N.E.2d at 404.
111. Id. The court stated, "we are not confronted with the issue of whether, under the Illinois
FOIA, the existence of an exemption imposes an affirmative duty on an agency to withhold
information sought." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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information. 114 Furthermore, the court stated that "[b]ecause the
Board had a substantial interest in the subject matter of the request, it
was entitled to assert an exemption, if one exists, despite the State's
Attorney's refusal to do so."'t 5 The court focused on the fact that the
University may still have possessed an interest in the confidentiality of
the information and, consequently, still had a right to assert an
exemption.116
2. Federal Approach to Reverse-FOIA
In Twin-Cities Broadcasting Corp. v. Reynard, the parties disputed
whether a government agency has a duty to utilize an exemption
under the Illinois FOIA.t1 7 While the Illinois Appellate Court did not
rule on the issue, it acknowledged the authority of the seminal U.S.
Supreme Court case, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. 18 In Chrysler, a gov-
ernment contractor relinquished information regarding its workforce
to a government agency.119 Subsequently, the government agency re-
ceived a FOIA request for that information and determined that it
would disclose it.120 The agency chose to notify Chrysler of the FOIA
request and its decision to disclose the information because Chrysler
was a government contractor.121 In response, Chrysler sued the
agency, arguing that the information was exempt from FOIA and that,
as a result, the agency could not disclose it.122
The Court held that the government agency did not have a duty to
employ an exemption because "Congress did not design the FOIA
exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.' ' 123 However, the
Court also found that the corporation potentially suffered a legal
wrong because of the agency's action.124 Consequently, the corpora-
tion was entitled to judicial review of that agency action pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 25 Following Chrysler, the
Fifth Circuit noted that "under the APA, a court can set aside an
114. The court stated, "mere possession of the documents, standing alone, is not determina-
tive of an agency's ability to release documents pursuant to the FOIA if another governmental
entity has a substantial interest in asserting an exemption." Id.
115. Id. at 405.
116. Twin-Cities Broad. Corp., 661 N.E.2d at 404.
117. Id. at 403.
118. Id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)).
119. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 287.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 287-88.
123. Id. at 293.
124. Id. at 318.
125. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 318 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1972)).
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agency's determination if it is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' "126
In the aftermath of Chrysler, courts have affirmed the general rule
that FOIA does not create a private right to prevent disclosure, but
simultaneously courts have allowed private individuals to challenge an
administrative decision under the APA.127 In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Air Force, a federal circuit court noted that the APA provides
at least two avenues for a private party to challenge a government
agency's release of information. 128 First, a party may seek review of
an agency action "on the ground it is 'contrary to law."' 129 Second, a
party may seek review of an agency decision on the ground that it is
arbitrary or capricious.1 30 The court concluded its opinion with a call
for an examination of the purpose and use of FOIA, and noted that
disclosing information about private parties "that reveals little or
nothing about an agency's own conduct" does not foster the purpose
of FOIA.131 While the federal approach to reverse-FOIA does not
provide a wide range of remedies for private parties affected by gov-
ernment disclosure of information, it does more to protect private in-
terests than the Illinois FOIA. 132
In contrast to the federal approach to reverse-FOIA cases, the Illi-
nois courts have yet to decide whether a private party may seek judi-
cial review of a government agency's decision to disclose information.
Illinois law provides that a party may seek judicial review only of a
final decision of an administrative agency. 133 The Illinois statute fur-
ther defines an administrative decision as "any decision, order or de-
termination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular
case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and
which terminates the proceedings before the administrative
126. Doe v. Veneman, 380 F.3d 807, 813 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
127. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 318; Veneman, 380 F.3d at 813-14; McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
128. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
2004). The plaintiff sought to prevent the government's release of contract bidding information
submitted to the United States Air Force. The plaintiff argued that the release would constitute
a violation of the Trade Secrets Act and that the agency's decision to do so was arbitrary and
capricious. Id. at 1185.
129. The court noted that although the Trade Secrets Act does not provide for a private right
of action, a private party may still seek judicial review of an agency action that is contrary to law.
Id. at 1186 n.1 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).
130. Id. at 1186.
131. Id. at 1193 (citing Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm'n For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S.
749, 773 (1989)).
132. See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
133. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-101 (2006).
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agency.' 34 It is not clear from this definition whether an agency deci-
sion to disclose information despite a potential exemption constitutes
a final decision that terminates all proceedings in regard to the issue.
The Illinois FOIA seems to indicate that only a denial of access consti-
tutes a final decision for purposes of judicial review. 135
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS FOIA
In light of the Illinois FOIA's current problems, this Comment calls
for an amendment to the Illinois FOIA that would provide notice to
third parties who submit information to the government, provide an
avenue of recourse for those parties if the government improperly dis-
closes their information, and ensure that information flows freely be-
tween private parties and government agencies. Section A articulates
the primary argument against restricting disclosure under FOIA laws
at the federal level and explains how this relates to the Illinois
FOIA.136 Section B argues that the Illinois FOIA provides sufficient
safeguards to ensure that the fears expressed regarding the federal
FOIA will not become reality in Illinois. 137 Section C analyzes how
the Illinois FOIA fails to ensure the free flow of information by failing
to provide third parties with notice or recourse for disclosure.1 38
A. The Federal FOIA Problem and the Primary Argument Against
Restricting Disclosure
Analyzing the federal FOIA in relation to the Illinois FOIA is im-
portant for two reasons. First, the Illinois FOIA closely mirrors the
federal FOIA both in purpose and content. 139 Second, in creating the
Illinois FOIA, the state legislature and courts have noted that inter-
pretation of it should closely match its federal counterpart. 140 Conse-
quently, any call to amend the Illinois FOIA must address the
concerns regarding the government's use of the federal FOIA. De-
spite the challenges posed by the state and federal FOIA laws, courts
and scholars have argued that the laws must remain a forceful avenue
134. Id.
135. "Any person denied access to inspect or copy any public record by the head of a public
body may file suit for injunctive or declaratory relief." 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11(a) (2006).
136. See infra notes 139-159 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 160-171 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 172-235 and accompanying text.
139. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
140. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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for ensuring the public's right to know the activities of its
government.1 4'
While FOIA's role as a vehicle for the general public to acquire
knowledge of a government's activities is important, the role should
not encourage improper disclosure of private or privileged informa-
tion.1 42 A call for the protection of private and privileged information
held by the government does not necessarily infringe upon the general
public's right to access "full and complete information regarding the
affairs of government.' 43 Thus, this Comment only evaluates the
general public's access to information submitted to the government by
private parties; it does not advocate a restriction of the general pub-
lic's access to government-created and government-held information.
Recent events and the actions of the Bush administration have en-
couraged the argument that any alteration of FOIA laws will reduce
the public's access to government information. FOIA laws took on
new importance after the 9/11 attacks.1 44 Since that date, the federal
government has met public demand for openness with an increased
vigor for classification of government documents. 45 As one author
noted, "In the year following the September 11 attacks, the govern-
ment classified 11.3 million documents, which jumped to 14.2 million
the following year and 15.6 million the year thereafter."'146
In October 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memorandum
urging government agencies to utilize exemptions whenever agencies
believed the exemptions were "on sound footing, both factually and
legally.' 47 This policy marked a distinct change from that of the Clin-
ton administration, which encouraged "maximum responsible disclo-
141. See, e.g., Natasha Fain, Human Rights Within the United States: The Erosion of Confi-
dence, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 607, 624-25 (2003). In the past few years, courts and scholars
have increasingly encountered FOIA issues regarding the government's secrecy in dealing with
national security and specifically with enemy combatants. Id. at 625. While courts recognize
that secrecy infringes upon the public's right to access information about its government, much
of the information remains secret and inaccessible to the general public. Id.
142. See infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
143. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1 (2006).
144. See Peter M. Shane, Social Theory Meets Social Policy: Culture, Identity and Public In-
formation Policy After September 11, 2 ISJLP i, iii (2005).
145. See id.
146. Id. at iii (citing David Nather, Classified: A Rise in "State Secrets," 63 CQ WEEKLY 1958,
1960 (2005)).
147. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, FOIA POST, New Attorney General FOIA Memorandum
Issued, http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). The
FOIA report explained that Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA memorandum superseded the
Clinton administration's 1993 FOIA policy. Id.; see also Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The
Freedom of Information Act Post-9/1l: Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261, 272-73 (2003).
2009]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
sure."'1 48 According to a Government Accounting Office poll, thirty-
one percent of polled government officials admitted they were less
likely to use their discretion to disclose information as a result of the
new policies. 149 In 2002 and 2003, federal government agencies
fielded fewer FOIA requests, but generally increased the use of ex-
emptions in denying those requests.150
In addition to the expanding call for national security, the increased
scrutiny of FOIA requests has been largely attributed to the Bush ad-
ministration's obsession with secrecy.151 The administration has rou-
tinely resisted any oversight-especially that coming from the general
public. 152 Consequently, the most recent public debate concerning
FOIA has created a demand for a more rigorous enforcement of the
principle of that law: to ensure the public's access to the activities of
its government. 153
This national debate reflects the general arguments against ex-
panding the scope of exemptions to FOIA and limiting its applicabil-
ity to information submitted by private parties. By allowing
government agencies to exclude certain information from FOIA, ex-
emptions limit the public's access to government-held information. 154
For this reason, the expansion or addition of exemptions to FOIA
laws may thwart the purpose of those laws.' 55 Both state and federal
legislatures have acknowledged this danger, yet they have continued
to expand the number and scope of exemptions. 56 Ultimately, this
trend reflects an understanding that both state and federal FOIA laws
should not serve to trammel all other interests simply because those
interests may limit the laws' applicability. 157 For this reason, both the
148. Ava Barbour, Note, Ready... Aim... FOIA! A Survey of the Freedom of Information
Act in the Post-9/11 United States, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 208 (2004) (quoting GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON CHANGES RESULT-
ING FROM NEW ADMINISTRATION POLICY, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d03981.pdf).
149. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON
CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW ADMINISTRATION POLICY, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d03981.pdf.
150. See Shane, supra note 144, at iii-iv.
151. See Uhl, supra note 147, at 270-74.
152. Scott Shane, Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight On Secrecy Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2007, at A].
153. See id.
154. See Uhl, supra note 147, at 269.
155. Id. at 263-66.
156. See Pub. Act No. 83-1013, § 7. 1983 I11. Laws 6860; Pub. Act No. 94-953, § 5, 2006 I11.
Laws 3364.
157. See Pub. Act No. 83-1013, § 7, 1983 I11. Laws 6860; Pub. Act No. 94-953, § 5, 2006 Ill.
Laws 3364.
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federal and Illinois FOIAs provide an opportunity and a procedure
for individuals wishing to challenge a government agency's assertion
of an exemption. 58 Certainly, any proposal to alter the procedure
and scope of federal or state FOIAs strikes a fear that the government
will abuse the law and severely reduce public access. However, this
fear should not encourage public dissemination of private or privi-
leged information. 159
B. Illinois's Use of Exemption Does Not Create
Government Secrecy
While a legitimate fear exists that the exemptions may swallow the
overall rule of FOIA, such a fear has not become a reality in Illi-
nois.' 60 In this sense, the call for procedures protecting private party
submissions to government agencies is not a call for a limitation of
FOIA. Rather, it is a call for consistent application of procedural
safeguards to both requestors and submitters of information harbored
by the government. 161 Illinois state agencies have cited exemptions in
refusing FOIA requests; however, these exemptions have not under-
mined the overall goals of FOIA.162 Illinois courts have instead nar-
rowly construed the application of exemptions. 163 The government
agency citing the exemption bears the burden of pleading and proving
that an exemption applies to the information at issue.164 Furthermore,
Illinois courts have effectively applied FOIA's provision that requires
the government to release a document containing both exempt and
158. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3 (2006).
159. Indeed, Scooter Libby's actions and conviction provide a prime example of how the
branches of government can use the release of confidential information as a weapon. Neil A.
Lewis, Libby, Ex-Cheney Aide, Guilty of Lying in C.I.A. Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at
Al.
160. Ill. Educ. Ass'n. v. I11. State Bd. of Educ., 791 N.E.2d 522, 531 (Il1. 2003) (stating that in
light of FOIA's policy to provide open and accessible public records, exemptions to disclosure
under the statute are to be narrowly construed by the courts); see also Baudin v. City of Crystal
Lake, 548 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that a government agency must pro-
vide a detailed justification for an exemption claim, addressing the information requested
specifically).
161. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
163. See Cooper v. Dep't of Lottery, 640 N.E.2d 1299, 1310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that
courts should not construe exemptions broadly).
164. See Harwood v. McDonough, 799 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Il. App. Ct. 2003); Wayne County
Press, Inc. v. Isle, 636 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Osran v. Bus, 589 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992).
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non-exempt information, if the government can conceal the exempt
information. 165
In addition to the Illinois courts' limited application of exemptions,
the Illinois FOIA also provides procedural safeguards for persons de-
nied access to government documents as a result of an exemption. 166
If a government agency cites an exemption and refuses to release cer-
tain documents, the requesting party, after challenging that decision
within the agency, may seek judicial review of the agency's decision.167
This procedure ensures that a judicial body has the power to enforce
the general purpose of FOIA: to ensure that all persons have com-
plete access to information regarding government affairs, while nar-
rowly construing the exemptions to that principle. 168 Thus, a
government agency is severely restricted and subject to judicial scru-
tiny in applying exemptions in response to information requests. 169
Private parties that disclose information to the government do not en-
joy similar safeguards, however. 170 Ultimately, the Illinois FOIA's
failure to protect information concerning private parties threatens its
effectiveness in the same way that government secrecy does. 171
C. The Illinois FOIA's Failure to Provide Procedural Safeguards to
Third Parties
Although preventing abusive government secrecy is a noble reason
to promote fewer restrictions on the free flow of information under
FOIA, it is important to recognize the ramifications of ignoring the
procedural interests of parties affected by government disclosure.
First, the Illinois FOIA fails to provide notice to individuals who may
suffer harm as a result of improper disclosure. 72 Second, the Illinois
FOIA does not include an avenue of recourse for parties whose inter-
ests have suffered. 173 Third, the risk posed by the lack of procedural
165. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/8 (2006). See also Reppert v. S. I11. Univ., 874 N.E.2d 905, 909
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 522 N.E.2d 669, 675 (I11. App.
Ct. 1988).
166. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
168. See Twin-Cities Broad. Corp. v. Reynard, 661 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
169. See Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 548 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). In
describing the government's ability to utilize exemptions, the court stated, "Under the Informa-
tion Act, the burden of proof is on the City to establish that the material in question is exempt
from disclosure; however, governmental agencies cannot clothe material regarding the affairs of
government with an exemption from public disclosure by ipse dixit statements that the material
is exempt." Id.
170. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3.
171. See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 175-205 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
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safeguards may ultimately limit the free flow of information by dis-
couraging private parties from submitting important information to
the government. 174
1. Illinois FOIA Fails to Provide Notice to Submitters of
Information
As one observer noted, "The dual concepts of open government
and responsible government collide when the government requires
the submission of sensitive information. ' 175 The Illinois FOIA fails to
provide a submitter of information with procedural safeguards similar
to those it provides for requestors of information.17 6 Perhaps the most
blatant example of the Illinois FOIA's failure to provide procedural
safeguards is the absence of notice.'77 While the statute outlines a
notification procedure for requestors of information, it does not de-
mand that private parties receive notice when a government agency
decides to disclose the party's confidential information. 178
Generally, notice ensures that individuals whose rights may be af-
fected by government action receive an opportunity to have their case
heard by a court of law.179 Even though a party who submits confi-
dential or privileged information to the government has a vested in-
terest in protecting that information, FOIA laws do not command
government agencies to provide notice in cases of disclosure.180
On an individual level, the lack of notice can have dangerous effects
when disclosed information threatens to injure a third party. 181
Where a party provides the government with information regarding
another party's criminal activity, the disclosure of that information
poses a real danger to the providing party.182 That danger is magni-
fied when the government discloses the information, but fails to notify
the providing party.183 For example, Sterling had no reason or oppor-
tunity to suspect that his cooperation created a significant danger until
he began receiving death threats from his former cellmate.18 4 Thus,
after the disclosure but before the death threats, Sterling lived in the
174. See infra notes 212-235 and accompanying text.
175. Ronald Backes, Comment, Freedom, Information, Security, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
927, 942 (2000).
176. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3 (2006).
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 931 (2007).
180. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3.
181. See Sterling v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 47, 48 (D.D.C. 1992).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Id.
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vulnerable position of being oblivious prey to a dangerous predator. 185
Moreover, under the Illinois FOIA, Sterling's former cellmate would
have enjoyed a statutory right to receive notification regarding the
status of his request. 186
Sterling's case reflects an imbalance in federal and state FOIAs'
protection of rights. The federal FOIA provided extensive procedural
safeguards for Sterling's former cellmate, who had a diminutive stake
in the disclosure, but the law completely ignored Sterling's stake,
which involved his personal safety and well-being. 187 If the Illinois
FOIA provides notice to parties with very little interest in disclosure,
it should certainly provide notice to those whose interest are seriously
affected by government disclosure. 188
While this potential danger may itself provide a sufficient cause to
reexamine the Illinois FOIA, dangers posed to businesses also deserve
consideration. Certain federal agencies have recognized the need to
notify businesses when a third party requests information that may
deserve confidential treatment.189 For example, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has implemented a procedure to pre-
vent disclosure of potentially damaging information without first noti-
fying the submitting party.190 Pursuant to this procedure, a person
submitting information to the SEC may make a claim of confidential-
ity. 191 If the SEC decides to disclose that information in response to a
FOIA request, it will notify the business before disclosure. 192
In addition to the SEC's procedure, Executive Order 12,600 de-
mands that executive agencies provide notice to "submitters of
records containing confidential commercial information . . .when
those records are requested under the Freedom of Information
Act. ' 193 While a record submitter's petition for confidentiality may
force an agency to wade through thousands of documents in an effort
to determine the scope of the confidentiality as applied to the infor-
mation at issue, it ultimately ensures that an agency recognizes the
interests of those submitters. 194 Thus, the Executive Order forces a
185. Id.
186. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3(d)(v) (2006).
187. Sterling, 798 F. Supp. at 48.
188. See Lewis, supra note 159.
189. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 662 F. Supp. 496, 497 (D.D.C. 1987).
190. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 200.83 (2007)).
191. 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(c).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(e)(4).
193. Predisclosure Notification Procedures for Confidential Commercial Information, 52 Fed
Reg. 23,781, 23,781 (June 25, 1987) (noted by Ronald Backes, supra note 175, at 972, 1005 n.301).
194. See Occidental Petroleum Corp., 662 F. Supp. at 497.
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government agency to determine which information falls within an ex-
emption to FOIA and then to notify the business if it decides to re-
lease information. 195  In contrast, the government may refuse to
carefully examine the confidentiality of the information that falls
outside the Executive Order's protection because FOIA, by itself,
does not serve to restrict an agency's decision to release
information. 196
As an alternative to relying on a government agency's internal
rules, corporations often create their own safeguards by negotiating
the terms of disclosure with the government agency. 197 These agree-
ments often include provisions demanding that the government
agency treat information as confidential and refuse to disclose it.198
Some lawyers argue that "[a]t the very least, the agreement should
provide that, if the agency is required to comply with a FOIA request
for the documents, the agency will provide advance notice to the
corporation."199
In Illinois, companies have also recognized this danger with regard
to trade secrets and have petitioned a state agency to protect this type
of information.200 While state agencies are required to evaluate these
petitions, the Illinois FOIA creates no obligation to do so.2 0 ' Moreo-
ver, the process of negotiating a specific agreement with a government
agency requires resources not readily available for many small busi-
nesses and private individuals.202
Although the Illinois legislature created the state FOIA with the
hope that its federal counterpart would guide the state's interpretation
of the law, courts have failed to follow the lead of the federal govern-
ment with regard to notification.20 3 Certainly, both federal and state
FOIA laws create a dilemma for government agencies when they en-
195. See id. at 498.
196. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979). However, government agencies
are still subject to penalties for improper disclosure.
197. See Richard H. Porter, Voluntary Disclosures to Federal Agencies-Their Impact on the
Ability of Corporations to Protect From Discovery Materials Developed During the Course of
Internal Investigations, 39 CATm. U. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1990).
198. See id. at 1027.
199. Id. at 1027-28 (noting that the Department of Defense's rules require prior notice even
in the absence of an agreement); see 32 C.F.R. § 286.27(h)(1) (1988).
200. See Midwest Generation EME, LLC v. Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2007 Ill. ENV LEXIS 82
(Ill. Pollution Control Bd. Feb. 15, 2007).
201. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3 (2006).
202. See Porter, supra note 197, at 1007.
203. See H.R., TRANSCRIPrs OF DEBATE, 8 3 D GEN. ASSEMBLY, at 184 (Iln. May 25, 1983)
(statement of Rep. Currie). In describing the statute's application to trade secrets, Representa-
tive Currie stated that "when there is some close parallel between our language and language in
the Federal Freedom of Information Act, it is our intention that case law interpretations under
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counter potentially confidential information, but these agencies still
have the opportunity to balance both the submitter's and the reques-
tor's interests. 20 4 "Success lies in providing a workable formula which
encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis
on the fullest responsible disclosure. '205 The Illinois FOIA does not
utilize this successful formula because it fails to balance and protect
the interests of submitters of information by providing them with
notice.
2. Illinois FOIA Fails to Provide an Avenue of Recourse for Parties
Affected
In Chrysler Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that while
the federal FOIA did not create a private right of action to prevent
government disclosure of information, the APA did provide for judi-
cial review of any agency action that harmed a person.2 0 6 The federal
APA, however, is much broader in application than its Illinois coun-
terpart.20 7 In Illinois, only a state agency's final decision is subject to
judicial review, 2 08 but the Illinois FOIA does not address the decision
to disclose in relation to a submitter of information. 20 9 As a result, a
state agency's decision to disclose information may not constitute a
final agency decision in regard to that private party.210
Although Chrysler provides Illinois with a strong precedent for al-
lowing a submitter of information to seek judicial review of an
agency's decision to disclose, it is unclear whether Illinois courts will
follow the U.S. Supreme Court's approach. 211 This leaves information
submitters certain that they currently have no guarantees that a court
will hear a case regarding a government agency's decision to disclose.
federal FOIA should guide individuals in the courts in Illinois in interpreting the provisions of
House Bill 234." Id.
204. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 n.12 (1979) (citing S. REP. No. 813, at 3
(1978)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 294, 317.
207. See id. at 317. The APA allows for review of any agency "action," while the Illinois
FOIA only allows for review of an agency's final decision, which terminates all proceedings
before a state agency. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-101 to -102 (2006).
208. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-102.
209. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3 (2006).
210. See Twin-Cities Broad. Corp. v. Reynard, 661 N.E.2d 401, 404 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
211. See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293.
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3. Uncertainty Created by the Illinois FOIA May Reduce the Free
Flow of Information
It would be easy to include the FOIA's exemptions for privileged
information among examples of government secrecy. In fact, privi-
leges create a paradox: they serve to decrease the disclosure of infor-
mation for the purpose of encouraging parties to increase the amount
of information that they share. 212 The law's oldest testimonial privi-
lege, the attorney-client privilege, ensures the free flow of information
between an attorney and his client by preventing the disclosure of that
information.2 13 The law has embraced a general belief in the necessity
of privileges, and recent studies support that generally held belief.
214
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine released a study that lambasted
the state of healthcare in the United States. 215 After noting the pro-
pensity for preventable medical errors, the study proposed a solution
that involved the increase of information sharing within hospitals.
2 16
The study argued that medical providers should acquire accurate in-
formation regarding mistakes in medical care in order to prevent them
from occurring in the future.21 7 Along with the United States Con-
gress, many state legislatures have created medical peer review privi-
leges, which generally protect information gathered by health care
providers in an effort to examine past failures and prevent future
ones.
218
The MSA, discussed in Part II.B, is Illinois's answer to the danger-
ous state of healthcare. 219 In its most general terms, the MSA protects
information that is gathered for the purpose of improving health-
212. See Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy Regulation on Medical
Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 362 (2001). While referring to the
privacy issues in the medical industry, Terry states, "At first glance, protecting privacy and im-
proving quality seem to implicate diametrically opposed operational imperatives. The protec-
tion of privacy suggests a need to decrease the flow of patient-related information, whereas
maximizing information and minimizing information costs are key strategies aimed at improving
the quality of care." Id.
213. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
214. See, e.g., To ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al.
eds., 2000) [hereinafter To ERR is HUMAN] (study evaluating and reporting on the state of the
American health care system in 1999).
215. Id.
216. Ronald G. Spaeth et al., Quality Assurance and Hospital Structure: How the Physician-
Hospital Relationship Affects Quality Measures, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 235 (2003) (citing
To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 214).
217. Douglas A. Hastings, Foreword: The Changing Face of Law and Medicine in the New
Millennium, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 135, 139 (2000) (citing To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 214).
218. Spaeth et al., supra note 216, at 237.
219. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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care.220 At the core of this protection is the principle that underlies
nearly all privileges: in order to ensure accurate and full disclosure of
information, the law must prevent disclosure of that information. 221
Because the outcome of litigation may hang upon the discoverability
of privileged information, the Illinois courts have developed a rather
intricate method of determining the scope and applicability of the
privilege. 222 While courts may recognize that the MSA prevents a
party from using privileged information in litigation, the Illinois FOIA
allows an administrative agency to disregard the privilege altogether
because an agency has the ability to determine whether such informa-
tion is privileged and therefore subject to a FOIA exemption.223
Although disclosure under the Illinois FOIA does not necessarily
mean that the information is subject to discovery, disclosure poses
other dangers. For example, a doctor may offer information to a peer-
review board that would be damaging both to the healthcare pro-
vider's liability and reputation. If either of these parties were in-
volved in subsequent litigation relating to that information, a court
would likely protect that information from discovery or admission as
evidence.224 Here, the court's ruling would reflect the MSA's premise
that where full and frank disclosure is necessary for public safety, a
party's disclosure should not create negative repercussions for her.225
In this sense, the effectiveness of privileges depends upon the pre-
dictability of their application.226 For a privilege to be effective, a
party needs to know not only that a privilege exists that can protect
her frank disclosure, but also that it will protect her disclosure.227 Ad-
mittedly, the problem of unpredictability already exists as a result of
varying judicial interpretations, but the Illinois FOIA unnecessarily
adds uncertainty because it allows state agencies to determine the ap-
plicability of a privilege in response to a FOIA request.22 8
In contrast to a court, an administrative agency, under the Illinois
FOIA, is not required to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a
privilege's applicability in response to a FOIA request or contemplate
220. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
222. See Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246, 250-51 (Ill. 1993).
223. See Twin-Cities Broad. Corp. v. Reynard, 661 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
224. See Roach, 623 N.E.2d at 251.
225. See id.
226. See William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist's Privilege, 23 CAR.
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 643-44 (2006).
227. See id. at 642-43 (noting that because the laws regarding a journalist's privilege are sub-
ject to ad hoc judicial interpretation, journalists have a very difficult time believing that the
privilege will protect an interviewee's statements).
228. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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the repercussions of disclosure upon an interested party.229 Further-
more, courts generally urge government agencies to examine FOIA
requests in favor of disclosure. 230 While some government agencies
may be familiar with the nature of certain submitter's information and
may be able to determine which information should be subject to an
exemption, most agencies are not equipped with the expertise neces-
sary to make an accurate determination of a privilege's
applicability.231
Although a court may later decide that information previously re-
leased by a state agency is privileged, it cannot eradicate the effects of
disclosure.232 A submitting party may effectively prevent the use of its
privileged information in litigation, but it will not be able to prevent a
requesting party from using the information in other damaging or
menacing ways.233 Ultimately, this creates the fear that privileged in-
formation may still be used against a submitting party. When a party
is uncertain whether information will be used against her, she is less
likely to disclose that information.2 34 This uncertainty will "chill so-
cially desirable communications, '235 and will transform the Illinois
FOIA into a deterrent to the free flow of information.
IV. IMPACT
The most important and universal impact of the Illinois FOIA's lack
of procedural safeguards and guarantees of confidentiality is the loss
of access to information. Confidential or privileged information often
is important to society as a whole.2 36 It is difficult to accurately define
229. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
230. Patricia L. Andel, Inapplicability of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege to the Drug and
Medical Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 130 (1997) (stating that FOIA mandates
courts "to tilt the balance in favor of disclosure" (citing Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674
(D.C. Cir. 1971))).
231. Nick, supra note 12, at 1321 (citing Kathryn M. Braeman, Overview of FOIA Administra-
tion in Government, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 111, 112 (1982)).
232. While courts are free to ignore an agency's disclosure of information as an indicator of
the applicability of a privilege, some courts have ruled quite the opposite. Federal district courts
have held that "information obtainable by a member of the public under the [FOIA] is not
privileged." See Andel, supra note 230, at 132 (quoting United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603,
635 (D.D.C. 1979)).
233. See Lewis, supra note 159. Scooter Libby's case is a prime example of how disclosing
information can serve as a powerful weapon, even when not used in the course of litigation.
234. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence on Privi-
leges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The Strength of the In-
group Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41, 62 (2006).
235. Id. at 63.
236. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES: EVIDEN-
TIARY PRIVILEGES RELATING TO WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS IN FEDERAL-LAw CASES §1:1 (2d
ed. 2007) (citing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990)).
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the ramifications of the Illinois FOIA's lack of procedural safeguards
because information submitters may never become aware of the gov-
ernment's disclosure. However, legal scholars have observed the im-
pact of other states' laws that are similar to that of FOIA. 237 Section
A illustrates that the current state of the Illinois FOIA threatens to
undermine the safety of the general public.238 Section B demonstrates
that the lack of procedural safeguards for those submitting informa-
tion to the government may hinder Illinois's economic growth. 239
A. The Illinois FOIA's Lack of Procedural Safeguards Threatens to
Undermine the Safety of the General Public
While examples of FOIA failures may not affect the general popu-
lous in the same manner as it did Sterling,240 the general public still
has a strong interest in implementing procedural safeguards. The
MSA provides a prime example of the potential impact of FOIA's
lack of procedural safeguards. 241 The MSA's premise is that the im-
provement of the quality healthcare depends upon full and frank eval-
uations of healthcare providers' performance. 242 Furthermore, it rests
on the belief that full and frank evaluation will likely not occur if such
information will later cause harm to those supplying it.243 Although
information provided to peer-review boards in the midst of an investi-
gation may find protection under the MSA in theory, its full protec-
tion depends upon the determination of a state agency or court.244
The current Illinois FOIA potentially allows a government agency
to refuse to exempt information that may fall within the MSA privi-
lege.245 Because the state agency may be free to ignore an exemption
without providing submitters of information any procedure by which
they may challenge disclosure, submitters of information are more
237. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 240-248 and accompanying text.
239. See infra notes 249-257 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
241. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101 (2006).
242. Id.; see also George E. Newton II, Commentary, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling
the Social and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 723 (2001)
(stating that "practicing physicians are in the best position to determine the competence of other
practicing physicians as they regularly observe one another's work and have the expertise to
effectively evaluate that work").
243. See Chi. Trust Co. v. Cook County Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Il. App. Ct. 1998).
244. See Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Il. 1993).
245. See Twin-Cities Broad. Corp. v. Reynard, 661 N.E.2d 401, 404 (I11. App. Ct. 1996). The
MSA provides that any person disclosing privileged information under the statute will face crim-
inal prosecution. This outcome is unlikely, however, because determining whether information
falls within the privilege is extremely difficult and often involves an intensive fact-dependent
analysis of the circumstances in which the information was acquired.
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likely to believe that their disclosures will cause problems in the fu-
ture. Consequently, they may be less likely to produce information
that is necessary to providing effective medical care. 246 This could
drastically undermine both the work of healthcare providers and the
state agencies that evaluate them.247 In particular, if healthcare prov-
iders fear that a state agency will improperly disclose information
under FOIA, IDPH may not receive the information it needs to inves-
tigate disease outbreaks, general hospital care, and licensing.248
B. The Illinois FOIA's Lack of Procedural Safeguards Threatens to
Undermine the State's Economic Growth
The federal government has expressly recognized the need to notify
parties who believed that the information they submitted was covered
by an exemption when a person requested it under FOIA, but Illinois
has not followed suit.249 Although the Illinois FOIA does exempt
trade secrets and other financial information, it should also provide
businesses with a method of ensuring that trade secrets or confidential
financial information remain secret and confidential. 250
State governments acquire confidential business information in a
number of ways, including licensing procedures, joint projects, and
general investigations. In particular, joint projects allow a state gov-
ernment to work alongside private industry in an effort to create a
mutually beneficial relationship in which a private company can help a
state agency that serves the public, while the company also utilizes
valuable government resources.2 51
The recent explosion of bioscience firms has created a new avenue
for state universities to acquire the outside expertise, resources, and
246. See Roach, 623 N.E.2d at 251. Although some legal scholars argue that the government
does not need to protect information to ensure full disclosure, the MSA is based on the principle
that submitters of information need this protection in order to fully disclose necessary informa-
tion. Thus, regardless of whether the protection is effective, FOIA could eradicate the intended
effect of the MSA. See Margaret Witherup Tindall, Comment, Breast Implant Information as
Trade Secrets: Another Look at FOIA's Fourth Exemption, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 213, 229-30
(1993).
247. See Newton, supra note 242, at 723-24.
248. See Illinois Department of Health, supra note 78.
249. See supra notes 175-205 and accompanying text.
250. The Illinois FOIA exempts "[tirade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person or business where the trade secrets or information are proprietary, privi-
leged or confidential, or where disclosure of the trade secrets or information may cause
competitive harm." 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(g) (2006).
251. Nader Mousavi & Matthew J. Kleiman, When the Public Does Not Have a Right to
Know: How the California Public Records Act is Deterring Bioscience Research and Develop-
ment, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 23.
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technologies that a privately held company can bring to the table.2 52
In fact, Illinois is home to the third-highest number of cutting-edge
bioscience researchers, behind California and Massachusetts.
2 53
While the explosion of new bioscience firms provides a new opportu-
nity for economic growth for the state of Illinois, it also exposes the
necessity of FOIA reform.254 Bioscience companies need a state gov-
ernment to provide a "stable and supportive public policy struc-
ture. '2 55  Where state government cannot guarantee the
confidentiality of information that is shared between a private com-
pany and a university, a company is less likely to engage in such a
relationship. 256 Disclosure of such information may place the com-
pany at a competitive disadvantage or prevent the company from re-
ceiving patents.257 Such impediments to business at the corporate
level may result in impediments at the state level.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois FOIA is akin to a leaky boat. In theory, it should float
by keeping confidential and exempt information from getting wet and
becoming part of the larger sea that is public information. In reality,
the confidential information is leaking through the cracks and threat-
ening the survival of the entire ship. Making matters worse, Illinois
has not recognized the importance of repairing the leaks. In its cur-
rent state, the Illinois FOIA allows state agencies to distribute confi-
dential and exempt information to the general public without
providing notice to affected parties or facing recourse for improper
disclosure. 258 In this sense, the Illinois FOIA treats information sub-
mitters and information requestors unequally. 259 Persons requesting
252. Id.
253. Id. $ 2 (citing BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, LABORATORIES OF INNOVA-
TION: STATE BIOSCIENCE INITIATIVES 5 (2004), http://www.bio.org/local/battelle2004/main-
report.pdf).
254. The author acknowledges a lack of empirical evidence showing that Illinois FOIA laws
restrict economic growth; however, other industry leaders and legal scholars have articulated a
similar argument in relations to other states. See supra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
255. Mousavi & Kleiman, supra note 251, 91 3 (quoting INT'L Bus. DEV. SECTION, CANADIAN
EMBASSY, BIOTECHNOLOGY MARKET STUDY FOR THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES (2002), http://atn-
riae.agr.ca/us/3729_e.htm).
256. See id. 1 6. In reference to the California version of FOIA, which, like the Illinois stat-
ute, fails to provide protection for submitters of information, the authors state "counsel for the
sponsors should consider advising their clients not to enter such agreements with California's
public universities where the risks of the potential disclosure of its sensitive information out-
weigh the benefits of the research." Id.
257. Id. 1 1.
258. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
259. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11 (2006).
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information under FOIA receive notice of the status of their request
and have a statutory right to seek judicial review of an agency's deci-
sion not to disclose information.260 In contrast, information submit-
ters neither receive notice of a government agency's decision to
disclose their exempt or confidential information, nor do they cur-
rently have the assurance of their ability to seek judicial review of an
agency's improper decision to disclose information. 261 Ultimately, this
may lead to a reduction in the flow of information necessary to ensure
the public's safety and the state's economic growth.2 62
Illinois legislators have three options in their approach to this FOIA
problem. First, they could simply ignore the problem and hope that
the courts will resolve it. Second, they could copy the federal govern-
ment's approach and demand that certain agencies provide safeguards
to private parties submitting confidential or privileged information to
those agencies. Third, they could acknowledge that parties submitting
confidential or privileged information should enjoy procedural safe-
guards regardless of the type of agency or sophistication of the sub-
mitting party. While this third option would likely require an
amendment to the Illinois FOIA, it would be in tune with many fed-
eral agencies' recognition that private parties are entitled to such pro-
cedural safeguards.2 63
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260. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/11(a).
261. See supra notes 90 and 94 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 78-82 and 250 and accompanying text.
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